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I. Introduction 
By 
* Donald W. Larson 
The stagnation of Dominican Republic agriculture in the last 
4 or 5 years has been discussed by the Dominican government as 
well as by international lenders such as the U.S. Agency for 
International Development (A.I.D.). Although the stagnation of 
Dominican agriculture (measured in terms of real gross domestic 
product) may have natural causes such as hurricanes, droughts, 
floods, diseases or infestations, government policies toward 
agriculture must also be examined to determine whether these 
policies may have contributed to the stagnation of production • .!/ 
The rate of growth in gross domestic product of the crop sector 
has been less than that of the livestock sector and both sec-
tors have grown slower than the total Dominican economy (Table 1) • 
The growth rate of the crop sector has been most disappointing 
with four years of negative growth from 1971 to 1980 including 
a stagnation of production since 1976. 
The purpose of the present paper is to examine the impact 
of price, exchange rate and credit policies on the aggregate 
*Professor, Department of Agricultural Economics and Rural 
Sociology, The Ohio State University. 
!/The stagnation of production is defined to be a rate of 
growth in real gross domestic product of less than 4 percent 
annually. This is the minimum required to keep pace with domes-
tic food demand, given that the Dominican population is esti-
mated to be growing at 3 percent annually and per capita in-
comes at one percent or more annually. 
• 
'' 
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performance of Dominican agriculture during the 1970s. It will 
be argued that The Dominican Republic, not unlike many other de-
veloping countries, has pursued price, exchange rate and credit 
policies which have adversely affected the performance of the 
agricultural sector. 
Agricultural price policy in developing countries is often 
.based on a compromise between forces that argue for domestic self-
sufficiency and hence high prices and those that argue for low 
p~ices to stimulate industrial processing of raw materials and 
to provide low cost food for urban, industrial workers. Such a 
compromise of ten tends to emphasize the level of nominal prices 
rather than "real" prices (that is, to adjust nominal prices for 
inflation) , and this becomes particularly serious in an inf la-
tionary ,setting where prices are adjusted with a lag.~/ More-
over, domestic prices are rarely compared to international prices, 
and when such comparisons are made, the appropriateness of the 
exchange rate is seldom considered. Government credit policies 
for the agricultural sector typically focus on preferential low 
interest rates and fail to recognize that credit is fungible and 
cannot easily be tied to particular activities. Moreover, in an 
inflationary setting such interest rate policies discourage banks 
t"rom maintaining the real volume of agricultural lending while 
providing substantial income transfers to a relatively few ere-
dit recipients. 
~/In the present paper, nominal prices will be adjusted for 
inflation using the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) deflater. 
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The analysis in the present paper focuses on the behavior 
during the 1970s of fourteen of The Dominican Republic's prin-
cipal agricultural products: rice, corn, sorghum, beans, pig-
eon peas, plantain, coffee, sugarcane, cocoa, tobacco, beef, 
milk, eggs and broilers. The following section relates the 
output performance for the products to their real (def lated) 
prices after discussing the various Dominican governmental in-
stitutions which control agricultural prices. The next section 
compares the prices of these products to international prices, 
that is, the prices of these products in the United States. 
International price comparisons are made at the official exchange 
rate and at a more appropriate exchange rate which takes into 
account the substantial over-valuation of the official rate. 
The next to the last section examines the real volume of bank 
credit by source of credit and discusses the problems of agri-
cultural credit. The final section summarizes the main conclu-
sions of the analysis for government price and interest rate 
policies. 
II. Agricultural Price Policy Institutions 
Several government institutions play a major role in agri-
cultural price policy. The Institute de Estabilizacion de 
Precios (INESPRE), established by Law No. 526 in December of 
1969, has the responsibility in Article 2 "to regulate the prices 
of agricultural products in the national market which in the 
judgment of INESPRE require such regulation using the process of 
demand and supply of these products." The key features of INESPRE 
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market intervention policies are the price support program 
which guarantees minimum purchase prices to farmers for a wide 
variety of basic food products (rice, sugar, red beans, black 
beans, corn, sorghum, garlic, potatoes, red onions, and yellow 
onions) and the monopoly control over imports and exports of 
food products which effectively protects the domestic market 
from the international market. To implement the price support 
program INESPRE buys directly from farmers through about 50 pur-
chase agencies located throughout the country and it also buys 
from merchants for some products such as rice. In August of 
1982, INESPRE's total storage capacity was about 1.4 million 
quintales for grain, 10,000 tons of edible oil storage and 12 
cold storage facilities.~ 
To maintain favorable and stable consumer prices, INESPRE 
sells most (95%) of the products to wholesalers and retailers 
and the remaining portion (about 5%) directly to low income 
consumers in the "Programa de Ventas Populares" through mobile 
stores and INESPRE stores. Because of high operating costs, 
management inefficiencies, and lack of adequate employee train-
ing, INESPRE has regularly depended upon substantial government 
subsidies to remain in operation. 
To assist in the price control program, Law No. 13 of 
April 27, 1963 established the Direccion General de Control de 
Precios of the Secretaria de Estado de Industria y Comercio 
with broad authority to set maximum selling prices at the retail, 
~lone quintale is equal to 100 pounds. 
.. 
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wholesale and producer level for articles of primary necessity. 
This authority included nearly all food products and maximum 
selling prices were established for these products throughout 
much of the 1960s and 1970s. The maximum selling prices will 
cause decreasing real farm prices whenever the maximum selling 
price is adjusted upward by less than the inflation rate. How-
ever, by April of 1982 the actual number of food products sub-
ject to price controls had been reduced to edible oils, sugar, 
rice, wheat flour, pastas, bread, tomato paste, milk and broil-
ers (Appendix Table 1). Because of the many problems associ-
ated with price controls, the move to eliminate such controls 
for food products is noteworthy.!/ 
Government institutes for selected export crops also 
make important contributions to agricultural price policy. The 
Consejo Estatal del Azucar (CEA) has vast control over the 
production, marketing and price policy for sugar in the export 
and domestic markets. Likewise, the Institute de Cafe and the 
Institute de Cacao make valuable contributions to coffee ang 
cocoa price policy. Producer organizations and cooperatives 
also play an important role in agricultural price policy for 
major commodities such as coffee, sugar, cocoa, beef, dairy, 
and poultry. 
!/For a discussion of these problems, see "The Problems 
and Effects of Price Controls on Honduran Agriculture" by 
Donald W. Larson, ESO 929, Department of Agricultural Economics 
and Rural Sociology, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio, 
April, 1982. 
,, 
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III. Production and Real Farm Prices 
In this section, changes in production and real farm ~ 
prices (nominal farm prices adjusted by the GDP deflater) are 
analyzed for rice, corn, sorghum, beans, pigeon peas, coffee, 
cocoa, tobacco, sugarcane, plantain, beef, milk, eggs, and 
broilers from 1970 to 1981. 
As might be expected, nominal prices for all 14 products 
have increased steadily from 1970 to 1981 primarily because of 
the general inflation in the economy (Tables 2 through 5). How-
ever, the real farm prices for 7 of the 14 products have de-
creased, in some cases substantially, during the 1970s (Table 6). 
Basic Grains and Beans 
The production-consumption balance for basic grains and 
beans is such that The Dominican Republic is a large importer 
(deficit producer) of basic grains. With the exception of 
1979 and 1982, The Dominican Republic has been a deficit pro-
ducer of rice (the staple of the Dominican diet) with domestic 
production equal to about 90 percent of consumption. Rice im-
ports in 1981 were about 65,000 metric tons. Since The Dominican 
Republic does not produce wheat, it must import all the wheat 
for domestic consumption which averages about 160,000 metric 
tons annually. In the case of feed grains (corn and sorghum) 
imports have averaged about 180,000 metric tons annually because 
domestic production equals only one-third of consumption. The 
Dominican Republic is nearly self-sufficient in red and black 
bean production since it generally exports a small amount of 
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black beans and imports small amounts of red beans or pinto 
beans to meet domestic consumption needs. The Dominican Republic -
is self-sufficient in pigeon pea production. 
Production of rice was quite dynamic during the 1970s, in-
creasing at an average annual rate of almost 9.0 percent (Table 6). 
On the other hand, the real farm price of rice has decreased at 
an average annual rate of nearly 2 percent in this same period. 
At the end of the 1970s, the real farm price of rice was signifi-
cantly below the price which prevailed at the beginning of the 
decade. Price controls in combination with INESPRE rice policy 
have been major factors contributing to these declining real 
farm prices of rice. Sorghum production has increased faster 
(an average annual rate of 18 percent) than the production of 
any of the other products studied. This rapid rate of growth 
in production has been achieved in part because of intensive 
government efforts to promote sorghum production as a substi-
tute for imported corn. Despite this rapid growth in produc-
tion, sorghum production is only about half as large as corn 
production (Table 7). Since sorghum is a relatively new crop, 
a published series of farm level prices is not available so 
the INESPRE support price was used as a substitute. Surpris-
ingly, the deflated value of the support price has declined 
slightly from 1973 to 1980. Corn production has increased at 
a satisfactory rate of 4.7 percent annually; however, produc-
tion declined steadily from 1977 to 1980 and then rebounded in 
1981 (Table 7) • The real farm price of corn increased at a 
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rate of 2.6 percent annually; substantially higher than the 
rate of 0.5 percent annually for the deflated value of whole-
sale corn prices in Santo Domingo. The latter price trend 
seems more consistent with prices of other basic grains.~/ 
Red bean production has increased rapidly (7.6 percent 
annually) in response to rapidly increasing prices (8.8 percent 
annually) at the farm level (Table 6) • Because this rapid rate 
of increase in real farm prices looked unreasonably high, the 
rate of increase in the deflated wholesale price of red beans 
in Santo Domingo was also calculated (Table 6). The 2.9 per-
cent annual rate of increase in the real wholesale price of red 
beans seems more reasonable than the rate of increase in farm 
prices. Pigeon pea production has stagnated and is currently 
below the production levels of the early 1970s. The real farm 
prices of pigeon peas have also declined during the 1970s. 
Livestock Products 
Among the livestock products {beef, milk, broilers and eggs) 
The Dominican Republic is a net exporter of beef, self-sufficient 
in eggs and imports varying amounts of milk products and broilers. 
Beef production has expanded at a satisfactory 5 percent annual 
rate with the benefit of increasing real farm prices (Table 6.) 
About 90 percent of beef production is destined for domestic 
consumption and 10 percent is exported; all exports of beef are 
to the U.S. Thus, farm prices are essentially determinined by 
domestic market conditions. 
~/Larson and Vogel [1980] found a similar pattern of rapid 
expansion in rice and sorghum production and stagnant corn pro-
duction in Costa Rica during the 1970s. 
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Milk production which has expanded at only a 2.7 percent 
annual rate has failed to keep pace with domestic demand that 
is likely growing at a 4 percent annual rate (Table 6). Part 
of the domestic milk production shortage has been satisfied 
by imports of powdered milk products which are reconstituted 
for sale as fluid milk in the domestic market. Another part 
of the production shortage is solved by rationing the limited 
milk supplies among all potential users. One of the causes of 
the stagnation of milk production is declining real farm prices. 
Milk producers who have suffered from declining real farm prices 
at the rate of 1.3 percent annually, have had no incentive to 
increase production. The maximum selling prices of milk and 
milk products of the Direccion General de Control de Precios 
have contributed to much of this decline in the real farm price 
of milk. 
Broiler production, a success story in Dominican agricul-
ture, has increased at a very high annual rate of 9.5 percent 
(Table 6). Egg production, increasing at a 5.5 percent annual 
rate has been less dynamic in the 1970s, in part because of de-
clining real farm prices for eggs. 
Broiler and egg prices are determined in large part by the 
domestic markets. Neither broilers nor eggs have been imported 
or exported in amounts large enough to significantly influence 
farm prices. The real farm price of broilers increased at a 
1.4 percent annual rate while the real farm price of eggs de-
creased at a significant 3.4 percent annual rate in the 1970s 
i -
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(Table 6). Modern production techniques among the few large 
vertically integrated firms which control 95 percent of the 
market may ce the most important factor explaining the rapid 
growth in production even with declining farm prices for eggs. 
Export Crops 
The main export crops (sugar, coffee, cocoa and tobacco) 
accounted for 60 percent or more of The Dominican Republic's 
export earnings during most years of the 1970s. In many of 
those years sugar and sugar derivatives accounted for nearly 
50 percent of all export earnings. 
Domestic prices for the main export crops are determined 
by a combination of world market trends for these products 
and The Dominican Republic government policy which is carried 
out through various governmental and private organizations. 
The def lated farm price of sugarcane contains only a small in-
creasing trend from 1970 through 1979 even though it fluctuated 
widely from year to year. The real farm price of sugarcane 
reached a peak in 1975 and by 1979 had decreased to less than 
one-third of that price (Table 10). Production of sugarcane 
has been stagnant throughout the 1970s and by the end of the 
decade sugarcane production was below that of the early 1970s. 
The outlook for improved sugar prices and production is gen-
erally poor because of the currently high inventories of sugar 
in world markets and because of a change in the demand for 
sweeteners in the U.S. market where corn sweetener consumption 
has increased very rapidly and currently accounts for nearly 
- 11 -
40 percent of the U.S. sweetener market. Sugar exports reached 
a peak of 90 percent of production in 1973 and have declined to 
about 78 percent of production in recent years. Domestic sugar 
consumption, increasing at a fairly rapid 5 percent annually 
since 1970, has absorbed the additional sugar caused by the de-
clining proportion of production that is exported (Table 12). 
Output response in the coffee sector has been much better 
than that observed for sugarcane. Coffee production has in-
creased at a 5.5 percent annual rate in response to real farm 
prices which increased at the very rapid rate of 18.5 percent 
annually (Table 6). Coffee production reached a peak in 1977, 
dropped markedly in 1978 and then rebounded to 1977 levels in 
1979 and 1980 (Table 10). The real farm price of coffee in-
creased steadily throughout the decade and then increased 
sharply in 1980. 
Unlike prices and price policy for sugar and coffee, to-
bacco prices are determined by supply and demand in a competi-
tive market. There is no price support program for tobacco and 
the government does not buy tobacco. Neither is there any gov-
ernment monopoly to control tobacco marketing. Tobacco market-
ing is in the hands of the private sector and dependent upon 
world markets since 80 percent or more of domestic production 
is exported. Tobacco production has expanded at the very rapid 
rate of. 12 percent annually with real farm prices decreasing 
slightly from 1970 to 1980 (Table 6). 
In contrast to tobacco production, the output performance 
of cocoa has been a failure. Cocoa production has declined at 
• 
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about a 1.0 percent annual rate so that production was less at 
the end of the decade than at the beginning (Table 10) . On 
the other hand, the ·£eal farm price of cocoa, increasing at a 
23 percent annual rate, has fluctuated widely in the 1970s. 
The real farm price of cocoa increased four hundred percent 
from 1970 to 1977 and decreased to 60 percent of that peak 
price by 1980 (Table 10). The 1980 real farm price of cocoa 
was still more than double the level at the beginning of the 
1970s. In spite of this strong increasing price trend, cocoa 
production remained stagnant in the 1970s. 
Other Crops 
Although plantain production decreased only slightly dur-
ing the 1970s, production fluctuated widely in a couple of 
years. From 1970 to 1975 plantain production was stable; how-
ever, a drought in 1976 caused production to decrease by nearly 
50 percent and to continue at that reduced level through 1980. 
Because of government incentives to increase production, plantain 
production rebounded in 1981 to a level about 80 percent as 
high as that at the beginning of the decade (Table 11). Plantain 
prices have increased rapidly during the 1970s whether one con-
siders real farm prices or real wholesale prices. The real 
farm price of plantains has increased at a very high 30 percent 
annual rate while real wholesale prices in Santo Domingo for 
plantains increased at a 12 percent annual rate. Such different 
rates of increase between farm and wholesale prices cannot be 
possible and raise some questions of data inconsistency which 
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are beyond the scope of the present paper. Such issues merit 
further study and investigation because sound economic analysis 
requires a solid data b~se. 
III. International Price Comparisons 
When the prices of agricultural products in The Dominican 
Republic are compared with the prices of these same products in 
other countries, and these comparisons are made at the official 
exchange rate for the Dominican peso, The Dominican Republic 
appears to be non-competitive in the production of many agricul-
tural products. However, using the official Dominican exchange 
rate for such comparisons is inappropriate and misleading. Using 
the official exchange rate is not only likely to mislead govern-
ment offcials in setting price policies for the agricultural sec-
tor, but also directly affects agricultural output through in-
centives eor producers. If, as is the case in The Dominican 
Republic, the official exchange rate is over-valued, then reven-
ues received in domestic currency for export sales are accord-
ingly reduced, so that the incentives for producers to export, 
or even to produce those products which might be exported, are 
thereby reduced. In addition, the over-valued exchange rate 
reduces the domestic currency cost of imported goods so that 
the incentives to import goods, even goods that substitute for 
local production, are greatly increased. The over-valued ex-
change rate becomes, in effect, a tax on export products and a 
subsidy eor import products. When such distortions of incen-
tives become large, balance of trade deficits become inevitable. 
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For more than 20 years the official exchange rate has been 
one Dominican Republic dollar per United States dollar while at 
the same time the Dominican government has permitted trading in 
an open market whose rate fluctuates daily. As can be seen in 
Table 13, the premium of the U.S. dollar in the open market 
averaged less than 10 percent throughout the 1960s. However, 
the premium increased steadily throughout the 1970s and reached 
nearly the 50 percent level by April of 1982. In September of 
1982, the premium of the U.S. dollar in the open market was 
about 50 percent. 
There are two separate reasons for this over-valuation 
of the Dominican peso as measured by the premium of the U.S. 
dollars in the open market. The first reason is based on 
traditional purchasing power parity arguments.2/ This involves 
an analysis of the inflation rates of a country compared to a 
major trading partner. Inflation rates in The Dominican 
Republic which are higher than inflation rates in a major trad-
ing partner such as the U.S. will lead to an over-valuation of 
the fixed exchange rate. The consumer price index in Santo 
Domingo increased by 119.3 percent from 1969 to 1978 while the 
U.S. consumer price index increased by 78 percent in this same 
period which implies an over-valuation of about 25 percent in 
1978. It is likely that since 1978, inflation in The Dominican 
Republic has increased at an even faster rate relative to the 
U.S. Furthermore, the Dominican peso was already selling at a 
~/See Officer (1976] for a discussion of these arguments. 
. ' 
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premium to the U.S. dollar of about 10 percent in 1969. For 
these reasons a reliable measure of the over-valuation of the 
peso due to the purchasing power parity argument is the pre-
mium of the U.S. dollar in the open market. 
The second reason results from the structure of protec-
tion. It is now widely recognized that the protection of im-
port competing activities through tariffs and other trade bar-
riers implies negative protection for export activities, in 
part because the domestic currency is valued higher via-a-vis 
foreign currencies than it otherwise would be.l/ Tariffs and 
other barriers against imports reduce the demand for foreign 
exchange and thereby raise the value of the domestic currency. 
Estimates of over-valuation due to the structure of protection 
are based on comparing the existing exchange rate with esti-
mates of what the exchange rate would be under a regime of 
free trade.~/ This depends, in turn, on estimates of the elas-
ticities of demand for imports and of supply and demand for 
exports together with the rate of tax {or subsidy} on exports 
and the rate of nominal protection for imports {including both 
tariffs and other trade barriers).~ The above reasons together 
21see Balassa and Associates [1971] for a full discussion 
of effective protection and for estimates of effective protection 
for several developing countries including Brazil and Chile. 
~See Bacha and Taylor [1979]. 
~/Estimates of the over-valuation due to the structure of 
pr~tec~ion ~or Costa Rica based on data for 1978 were 20 percent 
which is quite modest compared to the estimates of Belassa and 
Associates of 27 percent for Brazil and 68 percent for Chile as 
of the mid-1960s. The structure of protection in The Dominican 
Republic is not likely to differ substantiallv from that in 
other Latin American countries. -
·• 
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with the premium of the U.S. dollar in the open market seem to 
indicate that it is not unreasonable to assume at least a 50 
percent over-valuation of the Dominican peso in relation to 
the U.S. dollar in 1982. 
When the official exchange rate is used to compare farm 
level prices in The Dominican Republic with those in the United 
States, one set of conclusions is reached about the competitive-
ness and efficiency of Dominican agriculture, but the conclusions 
are quite different when the over-valuation of the exchange 
rate is taken into account. As shown in Table 14, the ratio 
of Dominican farm level prices to U.S. farm level prices at the 
official exchange rate suggests that The Dominican Republic is 
more efficient than the United States only for beef and milk 
among the six commodities examined. However, when a 50 percent 
over-valuation of the official exchange rate is taken into ac-
count, The Dominican Republic is ~ore efficient in five of the 
six commodities: rice, sorghum, beef, beans and milk.lo/ Such 
a dramatic change in the competitive position for these products 
indicates clearly that an over-valued exchange rate can intro-
duce serious distortions in government price policies and can 
eliminate price incentives for producers of import substituting 
products or producers of actual or potential exports. 
The price ratios of Table 14 clearly indicate that Dominican 
agricultural prices for these commodities are low relative to 
lO/A price ratio of less than one indicates that The Dominican 
Republic is more efficient in the production of that product. 
. ' 
r ' 
- 17 -
the U.S. farm prices and that Dominican agricultural prices 
could be increased for some of these products to provide greater 
incentives for local production of corn, sorghum, rice and even 
milk to substitute for imported products. The over-valued ex-
change rate subsidizes the imports of agricultural products 
which depress local prices and discourage domestic production. 111 
Price support agencies such as INESPRE who import food at the 
over-valued official exchange rate frequently receive a large 
financial benefit from these subsidized imports which can be 
resold in the local market at much higher prices. If such an 
agency needs additional financial resources in the short run, 
the incentive to increase imports and earn a profit may be 
quite strong. 
When the differential between the official and market ex-
c~ange rates become as large as that for The Dominican Republic, 
the difficulties of maintaining that differential may become 
insurmountable. Importer access to foreign exchange at the 
official rate becomes quite valuable and can lead to bribes 
and favoritism to gain access to that foreign exchange. Like-
wise, how does the government convince exporters to surrender 
their foreign exchange earnings to the government at the off i-
cial exchange rate when they can get 50 percent more Dominican 
pesos at the market exchange rate. 
IV. Agricultural Credit 
The agricultural credit system of The Dominican Republic 
consists of the formal and informal lenders. The formal lenders 
l~/See Larson and Vogel [1980] for a discussion of this issue. 
... 
.. ' 
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consist of thirteen commercial banks, the government owned 
Banco Agricola and seventeen f inanceiras (quasi-banks which 
avoid many government banking regulations). A variety of in-
formal lenders such as agricultural product buyers, agricul-
tural input suppliers, moneylenders, friends and relatives also 
serve as important sources of agricultural credit. 
Among the formal lenders, the Banco Agricola is the main 
lender with about 55 percent of the value of new loans to the 
agricultural sector followed by the commercial banks with 30 
percent and the financeiras with 15 percent (Table 15). Al-
though the Banco Agricola is still the main source of funds, 
loans from the f inanceiras have increased much more rapidly 
than loans from either the Banco Agricola or the commercial 
banks (Table 15). 
The amount of new loans approved for agriculture increased 
steadily from 1974 to 1979 in nominal terms and even increased 
_by about 28 percent in 1970 Dominican Republic dollars. How-
ever, new loans approved will overstate the amount actually 
lent to agriculture because of the time lag between loan ap-
proval and amounts dispersed under the loan. If the time lag 
is large, the amount actually lent to agriculture in real terms 
may have declined from 1974 to 1979. 
The most important attribute of Banco Agricola lending is 
the objective of serving the small and medium farmer with loans 
at low interest rates. Large commercial farmers who require 
large loans are supposed to obtain their financing from commer-
. . 
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cial banks and financeiras at higher interest rates. With 
interest rates on the Banco Agricola loans set at 9 percent, 
the real interest rate (nominal interest rates adjusted for 
inflation) has been low or even negative in recent years. A 
frequently heard argument for these subsidized, low interest 
rates is that they improve the distribution of income and pro-
mote agricultural production in the face of other distortions 
which place the agricultural sector, and especially small farm-
ers, at a disadvantage. With respect to the distribution of 
income argument, bank agricultural loans in many countries have 
been found to be highly concentrated in large loans to rela-
tively wealthy farmers, a pattern likely to exist in the 
Dominican Republic and unlikely to improve the distribution 
of income. 121 For example, Banco Agricola loans up to RD$500 
equalled nearly 54 percent of all loans and nearly 10 percent 
of the value of all loans in 1975 and only 14 percent and 2.4 
percent, respectively, in 1981. Banco Agricola loans of 
RD$20,000 or more equalled 0.5 percent of all loans and 20 
percent of the value of all loans in 1975 and then increased 
to 3 percent and 43 percent, respectively, in 1981. 
The relationship between agricultural credit and agricul-
tural production is also unclear. 131 As can be seen in Table 16, 
the nominal and real value of approved Banco Agricola loans 
12/see Vogel {1977] for a discussion of subsidized inter-
est rates and income distribution in Costa Rica. 
13/see Larson and Vogel {1980] for a discussion of this 
relationship in Costa Rica. 
... 
. ; 
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increased steadily from 1970 to 1980 and then decreased sub-
stantially (20 percent in nominal terms) in 1981. &one of the 
products considered in this study had production decreases of 
that magnitude in 1981. Table 16 also shows that the propor-
tion of Banco Agricola loans for the crop and livestock sec-
tors has remained quite stable throughout the 1970s, even though 
the crop and livestock sectors performed quite differently in 
this period as shown in Table 1. The lack of data on amounts 
of money actually lent by product and year during the 1970s by 
the banking system precludes any closer examination of the re-
lationship between agricultural credit and production in the 
Dominican Republic at the present time. 
V. Conclusions 
Dominican Republic agriculture has tended to stagnate dur-
ing the 1970s, especially the crop sector since 1976. Adverse 
government price and exchange rate policies have contributed 
significantly to this stagnation. Although nominal prices of 
all 14 agricultural products studied have increased in the 1970s 
converting to real prices using the deflator for gross domestic 
product reveals lower real prices for half of these products 
at the end of the decade than at the beginning or in mid-decade. 
Government price policies have either ignored the effects of 
inflation on agricultural price levels or have attempted to com-
bat inflation through agricultural price controls, and these 
have been costly in terms of agricultural output foregone. The 
. .. 
.... 
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basic grains (rice, corn and sorghum), beans and milk appear 
to have been most affected by these policies. 
When the prices of agricultural products in The Dominican 
Republic are compared with the prices of these same products 
in other countries, and these comparisons are made at the offi-
cial exchange rate for the Dominican peso, The Dominican 
Republic appears to be non-competitive in the production of 
many agricultural products. However, using the official 
Dominican exchange rate for such comparisons is inappropriate 
and misleading because of the substantial over-valuation of 
the Dominican peso which becomes a tax on export products and 
a subsidy on import products. When a 50 percent over-valuation 
of the official exchange rate is taken into account, Dominican 
producers are shown to be efficient and competitive in several 
products which are not currently being exported or are even be-
ing imported. In fact, the price ratios indicate that Dominican 
agricultural prices are low relative to U.S. farm prices and 
that Dominican agricultural prices could be increased for corn, 
sorghum, rice and milk to provide greater incentives for local 
production. The over-valued exchange rate introduces another 
bias toward food imports because price support agencies such 
as INESPRE who import food at the official exchange rate re-
ceive a large financial benefit from the subsidized imports. 
If such an agency needs additional financial resources in the 
short run, the incentive to increase imports and earn a profit 
may be quite strong. 
~ ... 
.. \ 
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Government credit policies of subsidized low interest 
rates on bank agricultural loans, especially for small and 
medium farmers have done little or nothing to off set the ad-
verse effects of price and exchange rate policies. The rela-
tionship between agricultural credit and agricultural produc-
tion is unclear. In addition, the subsidized, low interest 
rates have led to an increased concentration toward large 
borrowers among the loans approved by the Banco Agricola (the 
main agricultural lender) during the late 1970s. 
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CUADRO 1 
Tasa de Crecimiento del Producto Bruto Interno de la Economia Total y 
las Sectores de Agricultura y Pecuario Republica Dominicana, 1971-~0 
Ano 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
Tasa de Crecimiento del Producto Bruto Interno en 
Precios de 1970 
Ag_ricultura (%) Pecuario (%) Economia Total (%) 
6.6 6.0 8.4 
-1.2 5.3 12.3 
13.8 3.8 12.2 
0. 1 
-0.6 7.4 
-5.8 5.6 5. 1 
9.1 4. 1 6.7 
-0.2 7.2 5.0 
2.6 8.4 2.1 
-2.0 3.0 4.7 
3.0 7.5 5.8 
Source: Banco Central de la Republica Dominicana, 
Departamento de Estudios Economicos. 
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Cuadro 2 
Precios Promedios Corrientes Pagados en Finca Para Granos, 
Republica Dominicana, 1970-80 
Precios Promedios Corrientes en Finca Para 
Ano Arroz Maiz Sor go 
- RD$ per tonelada metrica 
1970 158 76 
1971 158 76 
1972 152 81 
1973 182 110 
1974 232 105 
1975 253 146 
1976 248 119 
1977 269 127 
1978 276 119 
1979 242 154 
1980 282 198 
N.D. significa informacion No Disponible. 
Fuente: Banco Central de la Republica Dominicana, Departamento de 
Estudios Economicos. 
N.D. 
N.D. 
N.D. 
94 
94 
94 
110 
132 
143 
143 
172 
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Cuadro 3 
Precios Promedios Corrientes Pagados en Finca ParaCultivos Selecionadas, 
Republica Dominicana, 1970-81 
Precios Promedios Corrientes en Finca Para 
Ano Habichuelas Rojas Guandules Platanos 
- - - - RD$/TM - - - - - - RD$/000 unidades 
1970 270.0 189.8 6.39 
1971 275.6 198.0 5.56 
1972 298.8 2.3.5 6.95 
1973 422.7 245.7 12.50 
1974 452.2 278.1 14.17 
1975 797.4 318.2 34.80 
1976 565.1 343.2 26.00 
1977 788.9 387.1 36.80 
1978 731. 2 400. 8 28.00 
1979 683.4 308.7 50.00 
1980 1,029.5 388.1 84.00 
Fuente: Banco Central de la Republica Dominicana, Departamento de 
Estudios Economicos. 
' 
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Cuadro 4 
Precios Promedios Corrientes Pagados en Finca Para Cultivos De 
Exportacion, Republica Dorninicana, 1970-18 
Precios Prornedios Corrientes en Finca Para 
Ano Cafe Cana de Azucar Cacao Tobaco 
- RD$ per tonelada rnetrica 
1970 250.7 6. 77 443.0 643.2 
1971 270.9 6. 77 374.0 682.2 
1972 295.3 7. 72 396.0 713.7 
1973 346.7 8.49 671. 0 772.9 
1974 388.7 14.42 1,327.0 750.3 
1975 426.1 21. 93 902.0 788.8 
1976 734.8 12.89 1,548.0 602.3 
1977 1,277.0 9.47 2,896.0 933.3 
1978 1, 091. 4 10.00 2,456.0 505.2 
1979 1,376.1 9.48 2,116.4 661.4 
1980 2,498.3 N.D. 2,116.4 1,016.3 
N.D. Significa inforrnacion No Disponible. 
Fuente: Banco Central de la Republica Dorninicana, Departamento do 
Estudios Econornicos. 
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Cuadro 5 
Precios Promedios Corrientes Pagados en Finca Para Productos 
Pecuarios, Republica Dominicana 1970-80 
Precios Promedios Corrientes en Finca Para 
Ano Lee he Pollos Huevos Carne de 
RD$/OOO 
RD$/OOO lt RD$/TM Unidada RD$/TM 
1970 142.8 1,203 46.7 632 
1971 154.6 1,291 39.1 678 
1972 154.5 1,348 40.6 708 
1973 165.5 1,606 42.9 844 
1974 188.4 1,791 53.7 941 
1975 219.9 1,808 52.1 950 
1976 230.9 1,804 48.3 948 
1977 237.6 1,823 58.2 958 
1978 237.6 1,974 56.7 1,037 
1979 281.8 2,542 61. 3 1,335 
1980 281.8 3,050 73.7 N.D. 
N.D. significa informacion No Disponible. 
Fuente: Banco Central de la Republica Dominicana, Departamento do 
Estudios Economicos. 
Res 
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CUADRO 6 
La Tasa Anual Promedio de Crecimiento de la Producci6n 
y Precios Reales en Finca de Productos Seleccionados 
Republic a Dominicana, 1971-1981 
Produce ion Precios en Fine a 
Producto (%) (%) 
Leche 2. 72 -1.29 
Pollos 9.54 1.38 
Huevos 5.54 -3.39 
Arr oz 8.99 -1. 94 
Maiz 4.67 2.64 
Sor go 18.36 -0.87 a/ 
Habichuelas Rojas 7.60 8.81 
Guandules 2.14 -0.36 
Cafe 5.51 18.56 
Platanos -0.05 29.88 
Cacao -0.99 23.45 
Tabaco 12.02 -0.03 
Carne de Res 5.15 1.5 
Azucar -0.10 0.7 
2:_/ Incluye la tasa de crecimiento de los precios reales de 
sustentaci6n de 1973 hasta 1980. 
Fuente: Calculado. 
Precio de 
Mayorista 
0.55 
2.97 
12.3 
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CUADRO 7 
Produccion y Precios Reales para Granos 5asicos 
Republica Dominicana, 1970-1981 a/ 
P r o d u c t o s 
Arroz en Cascara Mal.z 
Aiio Produccion En Finca 
Sor go 
Produccion En Finca b/ Produccion En Finca 
Calendario (TM) (RD$/Ton) (TM) (RD$/Ton) (TM) (RD$ /Ton) 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
!!_/ 
E_/ 
N.D. 
210,000 158 45,000 76 N.D. 
212,000 156 49,000 75 6,752 
214,000 139 50,000 74 5,421 
373,242 159 46,600 96 9,040 
259,446 173 48,800 78 15,000 
218 ,611 175 46,122 101 16 ,071 
312,228 153 66,621 73 17,277 
308,041 150 65,488 71 17 ,411 
351,000 153 49,342 66 18,080 
376,000 120 48,068 76 22,321 
397,000 123 45,760 86 24,687 
400,460 N.D. 62 ,896 N.D. 33,585 
Precios corrientes en finca deflacionados por el 1ndice deflater 
del Producto Bruto Interno con el afio base de 1970. 
Precio real de sustentacion de INESPRE. 
significa informacion No Disponible. 
Fuente: Banco Central de la Republica Dominicana, Departamento de 
Estudios Economicos y Comite Interinstitucional del Sistema 
de Informacion Estad!stica del Sector Agropecuario. 
N.D. 
N.D. 
N.D. 
83 
71 
66 
69 
75 
81 
72 
76 
N.D. 
, 
- 30 -
CUADRO 8 
Produccion y Precios Reales para Habichuelas 
Republica Dominicana, 1970-1981 f!/ 
P r o d u c t o s 
Habichuela Roja Habichuela Negrab/ Guandules 
Ano Produccion En Finca Produccion En Finca Produccion En Finca 
Calendario (TM) (RD$/Ton) (TM) (RD$/Ton) (TM) (RD$/Ton) 
1970 25,000 270 N.D. N.D. 25,000 
1971 28,000 272 N.D. N.D. 26,000 
1972 30,000 273 N.D. N.D. 27,000 
1973 33,800 370 N.D. N.D. 27,016 
1974 43,730 336 N.D. N.D. 28,369 
1975 35,709 553 N.D. N.D. 29,454 
1976 36,735 349 N.D. N.D. 14,512 
1977 35,873 441 4,866 N.D. 15,465 
1978 41,542 405 3,522 N.D. 16,553 
1979 49,676 339 11,651 N.D. 14,694 
1980 51,502 448 11,295 N.D. 18,454 
1981 52,387 N.D. N.D. N.D. 24,008 
f!/ Precios currientes deflacionados con el 1ndice deflater del Producto 
Bruto Interno con el ano base de 1970. 
b/ La produccion esta inclu1da con la produccion de habichuela roja. 
N.D. significa informacion No Disponible. 
Fuente: Banco Central de la Republica Dominicana, Departamento de 
Estudios Economicos. 
189 
196 
195 
215 
207 
221 
212 
216 
222 
153 
169 
N.D. 
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CUADRO 9 
Produccion y Precios Reales para Leche, Pollos y Huevos 
Republica Dorninicana, 1970-1981 2:,.1 
P r o d u c t o s 
Leche Pollos Huevos 
Ano 
Calendario 
Produccion 
(000 ltr) 
En Finca 
(RD$/OOO lt) 
Produccion 
(TM) 
En Finca 
(RD$/Ton) 
Produccion En Finca 
(000 Uni.) (RD$/OOO Uni.) 
1970 329,557 143 
1971 338,240 152 
1972 348,208 141 
1973 358,469 145 
1974 369,033 140 
1975 353,519 153 
1976 371,190 143 
1977 382,514 133 
1978 393,489 132 
1979 409,191 140 
1980 431,287 123 
1981 443,794 N.D. 
28,337 
29,600 
30,918 
32,288 
29,714 
38,633 
39,039 
45,000 
50,630 
50,135 
58,379 
72 ,592 
1,203 
1,276 
1,233 
1,406 
1,334 
1,255 
1, 115 
1,019 
1,094 
1,261 
1,330 
N.D. 
199,483 
208,454 
217,806 
227,549 
237,698 
248,263 
259,260 
265,368 
282,735 
294 ,411 
319,394 
359,706 
2:_1 Precios corrientes deflacionados con el 1ndice deflator del Producto 
Bruto Interno con el ano base de 1970. 
N.D. significa inforrnacion No Disponible. 
Fuente: Banco Central de la Republica Dorninicana, Departarnento de 
Estudios Econornicos. 
47 
39 
37 
37 
40 
36 
30 
32 
31 
30 
32 
N.D. 
Cafe 
CUADRO 10 
Produccion y Precios Reales para Cultivos de Exportacion 
Republica Dominicana, 1970-1981 a/ 
P r o d u c t o s 
_Cana ·de Azucar- Cacao Tabaco 
Afio 
Calendario 
Produccion 
(TM) 
En Finca 
(RD$/Ton) 
Produccion En Finca Produccion En Finca Produccion En Finca 
( 000 TM) _ _ __(RD$ /Ton) (TM) (RD$ /Ton) (TM) (RD$/Ton) 
1970 70,630 251 8,654 6. 77 37,924 443 22,319 
1971 87,192 268 9,973 6.68 32,470 369 22,818 
1972 96, 128 270 9,831 7.06 36,093 362 26'110 
1973 117 ,364 304 10,091 7.43 35,900 587 43,618 
1974 108,622 289 l_0,130 10.73 38,300 988 33,658 
1975 103, 710 296 9,337 15.21 30,909 626 34,622 
1976 113,994 454 10,932 7. 96 33, 100 957 45,385 
1977 120,416 714 11,091 5.29 34,474 1,619 34,918 
1978 86 ,810 604 11,093 6.09 36,960 1,361 54,203 
1979 120,782 678 10,304 4.70 35,916 1,050 44,562 
1980 120, 182 1,089 9,057 N.D. 28,481 923 52,043 
1981 109,660 N.D. 9,629 N.D. 31,818 N.D. 55,894 
~/ Precios corrientes deflacionados con el 1ndice deflator del Producto Bruto Interno con 
el afio base de 1970. 
N.D. significa informacion No Disponible. 
Fuente: Banco Central de la Republica Dominicana, Departamento de Estudios Economicos. 
643 
674 
652 
677 
558 
547 
372 
521 
280 
328 
443 
N.D. 
I 
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CUADRO 11 
Produccion y Precios Reales para Carne de Res y 
Republica Dominicana, 1970-1981 
Platano 
Carne de Res 
Ai'io Matanza Total En Finca 
Calendario (TM) (RD$/Ton) 
1970 32,000 632 
1971 34,000 670 
1972 37,000 648 
1973 38,618 739 
1974 39,339 700 
1975 36,630 659 
1976 40,274 585 
1977 41,700 535 
1978 43,886 574 
1979 44,191 662 
1980 49,188 N.D. 
1981 54,875 N.D. 
N.D. significa informacion No Disponible. 
Platano 
Produccion 
(Millones) 
l, 611 
1,653 
1, 613 
1,607 
1,687 
1,545 
830 
840 
868 
919 
868 
1,256 
En Finca 
1 (RD$/OOO) 
6 
5 
6 
11 
10 
24 
16 
20 
15 
25 
37 
N.D. 
Fuente: Banco Central de la Republica Dominicana, Division 
Agricola e Industrial, y Republica Dominicana en 
Cifras. Varios anos. Oficina Nacional de Estadistica. 
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CUADRO 12 
Produccion, Exportaciones y Consumo Interno del Azucar 
Republica Dominicana, 1970-1981 
Exportaciones/ Con sumo 
Aiio Produce ion ExEortaciones Produccion Interno 
Calendario (000 TM) (000 TM) (%) (TM) 
1970 984.5 769.7 78.2 120,680 
1971 1,098.2 981. 7 89.4 132,316 
1972 1, 139. 0 1, 108. 1 97.3 141. 427 
1973 1,142.9 1,038.4 90.9 151. 285 
1974 1,194.1 1. 024. 2 85.8 166,964 
1975 1, 135. 6 946.9 83.4 161.196 
1976 1,249.5 969.8 77. 6 162,078 
1977 1,221.7 1. 084 .1 88.7 171,392 
1978 1.164.0 909.4 78.1 176,763 
1979 1.166.4 1. 004. 8 86.1 185,285 
1980 1.012.6 792.7 78.3 208,536 
1981 1.107 .6 864.0 78.0 206,309 
Fuente: Boletfo Estao1.stico INAZUCAR. 
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CUADRO 13 
Premio del Dolar en el Mercado Extrabancario en la Cuidad de Santo 
Domingo 1979-82 
Premio~/ Prem!~/ 
1960's (%) 1970's (%) 1980's 
1960 5.0 1970 14.7 1980 
1961 12.0 1971 14.0 1981 
1962 8.0 1972 11.9 1982 
1963 11.0 1973 13.2 
1964 10.0 1974 14.0 
1965 5.0 1975 18.0 
1966 8.5 1976 19.9 
1967 10.0 1977 22.0 
1968 11. 0 1978 25.2 
1969 10.0 1979 22.5 
Source: Banco Central, Boletin Mensual, various issues 
(1975-1982); Academia de Ciencias de la Republica 
Dominicana, ~c~nomia Dominicana 1976, 1977; pp. 292 
(1960-1974), graph. 
-~/Promedio mensual calculado en base a cinco dias por semana 
January 
April 
p . a/ 
remio-
(%) 
26.2 
28.4 
34.5 
47.6 
• 
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CUADRO 14 
Una comparacion de los precios en f inca en la Republica Dominicana y los Estados 
Unidos a la tasa de cambio oficial y a una tasa ajustada del 50% para la 
supervalorizacion del Peso de la Republica Dominicana 
Precio Medio en Finca 
de la Republica Dominicana 
Producto RD $/T.M. 
Arroz en cascara 
1980 282 
Maiz 
1980 198 
Sor go 
1980 175 
Carne de Res 
1979 1335 
Dry edible beans 
1979 683 
Leche-!!1 
1980 282 
Relacion de! Precio Dominicano 
al precio de los Estacios Unidos 
Tasa 
oficial 
RD$ 1.00 
per U.S. $ 
1.07 
1.53 
1.47 
0.64 
1.36 
0.96 
Tasa ai.ustada 
del 50% 
RD $ 1.50 
per U.S. $ 
0.71 
1.02 
0.98 
0.42 
0.91 
0.64 
Fuente: Banco Central de la Republica Dominicana y U.S. Department of Agriculture, "Agricultural 
Statistics 
!./ El precio de la leche es RD$ por miles de litros. 
, ' 
Anos 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
Junie 1980 
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CUADRO 15 
Creditos Otorgados al Sector Agropecuario 
por los Diferentes Intermediaries Financieros 
-1974 - Junie 1980-
(En Millones de RD$) 
~ Bancos Co- Banco Sociedades 
:merciales !/ Agricola Financieras 
68.3 76 .6 3.0 
79.2 84.7 17. 3 
77.4 90.4 18. 1 
89.7 106.0 26.3 
80.8 115 .9 28. 1 
85.9 158.6 39.6 
89.4 195.3 39.9 
FUENTE: Boletin Mensual {Julio/80) Banco Central, 
Departamento Financiero, 
Divisi6n de Encaje Legal. 
lJ lncluye compra de valores agropecuarios. 
Total 
General 
147.9 
181. 2 
185.9 
222.0 
224.8 
284. 1 
324.6 
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CUADRO 16 
Banco Agricola de la Republica Dominicana Valor de los Prestamos Formalizados al 
Sector Agropecuario, 1970 - 1981 
ProEorcion Para el Sector Valor de los Prestamos Formalizados!.1 
Total Deflacionado 
Ano Agricola Pecuario Otros Total en RD$ de 1970 
-----------
Por ciento --------------------· Miles de RD$ --
1970 77. 7 17.1 5.2 29,246.3 29,246.3 
1971 76.0 16.6 7.4 30,103.4 29,746.4 
1972 76.7 17.1 6.2 31,465.4 28,788.1 
1973 73.2 20.7 6.1 43,354.1 37,963.3 
1974 74.1 19.5 6.4 68,010.0 50,640.J 
1975 72.2 24.6 3.2 78,034.4 54,152.9 
1976 78.5 19.3 2.2 81,480.8 50,358.9 
1977 80.0 17 •. 7 2.3 83,501. 2 46,674:8 
1978 81.4 15.7 2.9 111,906.9 61,998.3 
1979 76.1 16.5 7.4 164,288.2 81,532.6 
1980 78.9 14.8 6.3 188,736.1 82,309.7 
1981 76.4 17.2 6.4 149,347.1 N.D. 
a/ 
- El valor de los prestamos f ormalizados no es iqual al monto de dinhero 
desembolsado durante el ano. El valor do ios prestamos formalizados es 
mas grande que el valor del dinhero desembolsado. 
Fuente: Banco Agricola de la Republica Dominicana 
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APENDICE NO. 1. Lista de Precios Oficiales de los Principales Articulos 
de Primera Necesidad al 20 de Abril de 1982 
ARTI CULO PRECIO (RD$) 
ACEITE DE MANI: 
botella, peso neto al detalle.............................. 1.00 
botella, envase plastico de 2 libras....................... 2.43 
botella, envase plastico de 1 libra........................ 1.26 
botella de 1 1/4 libra, peso neto 
(tipo botel1a grande de cerveza)........................... 1.25 
galen, envase plastico de 7 1/2 libras 8.26 
ACEITE DE SOYA: 
libra, peso neto al detalle................................ 0.74 
botella de 1 1/4 libra, peso neto 
(tipo betel la grande de cerveza)........................... 0.92 
Az'UCAR: 
1 1 ibra azGcar crema......................................... 0.15 
1 libra azGcar refine........................................ 0.26 
Saquitoazucarrefino (5 libras) •••••••••••• -.................. 1.30 
CEMENTO: 
Cementa gr is ti po Portland Colon ( funda), en Santo Domingo •.• 4.00 
Cementa gr is ti po Portland Titan (funda), en Santo Domingo ••• 4. 15 
Cementa gr is ti po Part land Cibao ( funda), en Sa:ito Domingo ••• 4.28 
CUl\DERNOS: 
De 36 paginas ••••••.•••••.•••.•••••.•.•..••••..••••••• ·..•.••• 0.07 
De 72 paginas ••••••••••••••••••••••••••• ~ •••••••.• ~.......... 0.14 
De 100 paginas............................................... 0.17 
GAS PROPANO: 
Cilindro de 25 l ibras ..••..•••..•..••.•.••..•...•......•.••.• 
Cil indro de 30 libras .•••.••••••••••••.••••••••••••••.••••••• 
· Cilindro de 50 libras •••..•••••••••..••••.••••••••••••. ~ ••••• 
Cilindro de_.10_0 libras ..•..••.••.••••••••.•••••••• · •••.••.•••• 
Gas Kerose~e, botella de 700 cc ••..••.••••.•••..•••••.......• 
ARROZ (Libra) 
HARINA DE TRIGO: 
5.80 
7.00 
11.so 
22.85 
0.20 
0.32 
Harina Dzama y Dzama G. (libra).............................. 0.20 
- 40 ._ 
APENDICE NO'. L (Conti nuado) 
ARTI CULO PRECIO (RD$) 
Harina Mol inero (1 ibra)....... .• . . . • . . • • . . . . • . . • • • • . • . . . • . • . 0.21 
Harina Primavera (libra).................................... 0.21 
Harina Blanquita, funda de 2 libras......................... 0.78 
SAL EN GRANO (1 ibra)........................................ 0.07 
PASTAS ALIMENTICIAS: 
Espaguetti, macarrones, coditos de 1 1 ibra· (caja) .....•.•. .. 0.48 
Can·elones de 1 1ibra •...••....•..•....•••••. ·•............... 0.42 
Espaguettis, macarrones, coditos, fideos de 1 libra......... 0.40 
Canelones (funda de 12 onzas)............................... 0.51 
Espaguettis, macarrones, coditos, f~deos, canelones 1/2 Lb.. 0.24 
PAN: 
Pan de brilla, de agua, unidad.............................. 0.04 
Pan sobado, unidad ..•.••..••••...••...•.••.. ~ .••.•.. ~....... 0.04 
PASTA DE TOl1ATES: 
Lata de 7.2 libras (1 galen)................................ 4.51 
La ta de 1 k i 1 0 • ••••••••••••••••• : • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 1 • 29 
Lat a de 1 1/2 kilo ...................................... ·...... 0.66 
Lat a de 8 onzas..... ...•.. .... ...•... •.• ..•.•.. ....•.... •... 0.37 
LECHE: 
Leche cruda (cuarti11o 946 cc).............................. 0.30 
Pasteurizada en envase de carton (cuartillo de 946 ~c)...... 0.45 
Pasteurizada reconstruida (cuartillo de 946 cc)............. 0.30 
Condensada Nestle de 412 grs................................ 0.70 
Condensada Nestle de 190 grs................................ 0.37 
Triangulito de Nestle ....•.....••...•.•.••.......••...... · ... · 0.09 
En polvo Nido de 1500 grs................................... 7.30 
En polvo Nido de 454 grs .•••..•.••......•••...•••....•.. ~... 2.28 
Evaporada Carnation de 330 grs.. ..•.. .. . •.. . .•. ..• ..••.•.•.• 0.54 
Evaporada Carnation de 150 grs.............................. 0.30 
POLLOS: 
V i vo, 1 i bra. . . • . . • . • • • . . . . • • . • • • . • . . . . . . . . . . . • • . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0. 46 
Congelado, libra............................................ 0.64 
.. 
APENDICE NO. 1. (Continuado) 
ARTICULO 
ZINC: 
Calibre: Plancha 
35 ..• 
30 .•. 
28 .... 
26. 
. .................. . 
24. 
22. 
29 ••••••• 
CLAVOS: 
Clavos para zinc, libra •• 
Clavos corrientes, libra. 
- 41 ..:. 
FUENTE: Direcci6n General de Control de Precios. 
PRECIO {RD$) 
3.80 
4.90 
5.75 
6.25 
].50 
8.25 
8. 75 
0.90 
o.42 
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